

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 00885 01 OF 03 022036Z

70

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01

CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 OFA-01 COME-00 DLOS-03 DOTE-00

EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 IO-10

JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 NSF-01 OES-03 OMB-01

PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 FEA-01 TRSE-00

/113 W

----- 020413

R 021629Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6777

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

CCGDSEVEN MIAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 NASSAU 885

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PLOS EFIS PFOR BF

SUBJ: MINISTER ADDERLEY ON LOS, LOBSTERS AND US BASES

1. SUMMARY: MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ADDERLEY CALLED ME IN FOR A 90-MINUTE DISSERTATION WHICH COVERED, AMONG OTHER THINGS: (A) THE ADEQUACY OF NEWSPAPER REPORTING IN THE BAHAMAS AND IN THE CARIBBEAN IN GENERAL, (B) HIS VIEWS ON APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR MARIJUANA USERS, (C) THE PROBLEM OF SETTING BAIL IN THE BAHAMAS, (D) LAW OF THE SEA, (E) THE SPINY LOBSTER QUESTION, AND (F) US BASES IN THE BAHAMAS. ONLY THE LAST THREE ITEMS ARE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF THIS MESSAGE. ON LOS HE WAS PLEASED WITH US COOPERATION AT GENEVA; ON LOBSTERS HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD SOON BEGIN TALKS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GCOB CONTINENTAL SHELF LEGISLATION AND ON BASES HE PROMISED A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS "IN A MATTER OF A FEW DAYS". END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 00885 01 OF 03 022036Z

2. LAW OF THE SEA. HAVING SPENT SOME TIME DISCUSSING OTHER

MATTERS IN A COMPLETELY RELAXED AND AFFABLE MOOD, ADDERLEY TURNED TO LOS. HE DID NO BY WAY OF REMARKING THAT HE HAD ON AN EARLIER OCCASION MADE REFERENCE TO HIS DISSATISFACTION WITH TREATMENT HE RECEIVED FROM A MEMBER OF THE US LOS DELEGATION. HE STATED THAT "AS A MATTER OF FAIRNESS" HE WANTED THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT AT THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED GENEVA CONFERENCE THE RELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE AMERICAN DELEGATION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER. HE FELT THAT THEY HAD WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY AND IN CLOSE HARMONY. I RESPONDED THAT I WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR THAT AND THAT IT CONFIRMED PRECISELY WHAT WE HAD HAD REPORTED TO US. MOREOVER, I MENTIONED THAT OUR DELEGATION HAD BEEN UNSTINTING IN ITS PRAISE OF THE MINISTER'S PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE ARCHIPELAGO DISCUSSIONS. I ASKED ADDERLEY WHAT HIS PERSONAL APPRAISAL WAS OF THE PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS. THIS WAS PROBABLY A MISTAKE SINCE IT LAUNCHED HIM INTO ANOTHER LONG(ALTHOUGH NOT UNINTERESTING) DISSERTATION ON PERSONALITIES AS WELL AS PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS. I THINK IT SAFE TO SUMMARIZE HIS GENERAL VIEW AS ONE OF PROGRESS HAVING BEEN MADE, BUT WITH AN OUTLOOK EXTREMELY UNCERTAIN. HE THINKS THERE IS NO CHANCE FOR AN AGREEMENT IN MARCH, BELIEVES THAT A GREAT DEAL MORE IN THE WAY OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IS STILL REQUIRED AND EVEN THEN IS NOT NECESSARILY OPTIMISTIC THAT A FINAL SINGLE AGREED DRAFT CAN BE ACHIEVED GIVEN THE EMOTIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL, NOT TO MENTION SUBSTANTIVE, DIFFERENCES WHICH SEPARATE THE PARTIES. HE DID MENTION IN PASSING, HOWEVER, HIS AGREEMENT WITH A RECENT LONDON TIMES ARTICLE WHICH CONCLUDED THAT A FAILURE TO REACH A LOS AGREEMENT WOULD BE FAR MORE HARMFUL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES THAN TO THE MAJOR POWERS.

3. SPINY LOBSTER. ADDERLEY CONFESSED THAT HE HAD NOT RECENTLY REVIWED OUR LAST NOTE, NEVERTHELESS HE VOLUNTEERED THAT HE THOUGHT THE GCOB HAD NO MAJOR ISSUES WITH US. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT I GIVE HIM MY PERSONAL VIEW AS TO HOW WE OUGHT TO PROCEED. HE CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT HE COULD SEE ALL SORTS OF VERY DIFFICULT QUESTIONS ARISING TO WHICH HE DID NOT HIMSELF CLEARLY SEE THE ANSWERS. HE CITED BY WAY OF EXAMPLE THE FACT THAT GCOB LEGISLATION REQUIRED THAT ANY CONCESSIONS MADE TO ANOTHER NATION WITH REGARD TO FISHING PRIVILEGES IN WATERS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 00885 01 OF 03 022036Z

UNDER BAHAMIAN JURISDICTION REQUIRED SIMILAR AND RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS. THUS, HE PONDERED ALOUD, IF THE US COULD NOT ENTER INTO SUCH A RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT THE LATITUDE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WAS IMMEDIATELY AND SEVERELY NARROWED. HE STATED THAT HE DID NOT SEEK A RESPONSE TO THAT SPECIFIC QUESTION, NOR, FOR THAT MATTER, TO OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE LOBSTER PROBLEM AT THIS MEETING, BUT RATHER WAS SEEKING MY PERSONAL VIEWS AS TO HOW THE ENTIRE MATTER MIGHT BE

APPROACHED.

4. I RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT I WOULD TAKE HIM AT HIS WORD AND NOT ATTEMPT TO ENTER INTO A SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHILE WE HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL OF HARD THINKING ABOUT THE VARIOUS ISSUES WHICH BORE ON THE SPINY LOBSTER ISSUE, BY NO MEANS DID I BELIEVE THAT WE HAD THE ANSWERS TO ALL THE QUESTIONS. INDEED, I SAID THAT COULD GO ONE STEP FURTHER; IT WAS NOT EVEN CLEAR THAT WE KNEW ALL OF THE QUESTIONS THEMSELVES ON WHICH BOTH SIDES REQUIRED CLARIFICATION PRIOR TO SEEKING AN AGREEMENT. THAT BEING THE CASE, IT SEEMED TO ME SENSIBLE THAT WE UNDERTAKE, AND WITHOUT DELAY, TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE. INDEED THIS IS WHAT WE HAD SUGGESTED EARLIER ON. I REMINDED ADDERLEY THAT WE HAD ADVANCED AN OUTLINE WHICH SUGGESTED EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN ISSUES WHICH HE AND I HAD PREVIOUSLY TOUCHED UPON. THE OUTLINE ITSELF WAS OPEN TO DISCUSSION AND ADJUSTMENT. INDEED, WE MIGHT USEFULLY BEGIN BY A JOINT EXAMINATION OF THE RANGE OF QUESTIONS WHICH IN FACT NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED. I SAID THAT I WAS CONFIDENT, GIVEN THE COMMON DESIRE ON BOTH OUR PARTS TO SEEK A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE ARRANGEMENT IN THE FACE OF THEIR NEWLY ENACTED LEGISLATION THAT SUCH A DIALOGUE WOULD SUCCEED. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO BEGIN.

WEISS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 00885 02 OF 03 022100Z

70

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01

CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 OFA-01 COME-00 DLOS-03 DOTE-00

EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 IO-10

JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 NSF-01 OES-03 OMB-01

PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 FEA-01 TRSE-00

/113 W

----- 020702

R 021629Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6778
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
CCGDSEVEN MIAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 NASSAU 885

5. ADDERLEY SAID HE APPRECIATED THE TENOR AND SUBSTANCE OF MY RESPONSE AND AGREED WITH IT. INDEED, HE SAID HE "FELT MUCH RELIEVED" SINCE HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH US WITHOUT SEEKING CABINET APPROVAL. HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT IF HE HAD TO APPROACH THE CABINET TO REQUEST APPROVAL FOR A HIGHLY FORMAL, RIGIDLY STRUCTURED NEGOTIATION, E.G. ONE SOLELY REPEAT SOLELY DEDICATED TO AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC LICENSING ARRANGEMENT, HE COULD NOT AT THIS TIME GAIN CABINET APPROVAL. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED HE COULD GAIN APPROVAL FOR UNDERTAKING A NEGOTIATION DESIGNED TO EXAMINE THE PROBLEM BEFORE US LEAVING OPEN FOR ULTIMATE RESOLUTION THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH MIGHT BE SUGGESTED.

6. IN RESPONSE, I REMINDED ADDERLEY THAT WHEN WE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER EARLIER WE BOTH HYPOTHEZIZED VARIOUS KINDS OF ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD AT LEAST IN THEORY SATISFY BOTH BAHAMIAN AND USG LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. LICENSING WAS CERTAINLY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 00885 02 OF 03 022100Z

ONE SUCH APPROACH WHICH, HE HIMSELF HAD EARLIER ADMITTED, WAS CERTAINLY NOT TO BE RULED OUT. BUT I SAID THAT WE NEED NOT, AND INDEED I THOUGHT IT ADVISABLE THAT WE NOT, PREJUDGE THE PRECISE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH THE TWO SIDES MIGHT WISH TO AGREE TO AS A RESULT OF THE DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUE WHICH WE HAD PROPOSED. I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE TWO MATTERS THAT DID CONCERN ME AND THAT I DID NOT WANT THE CONVERSATION TO FAIL TO RECORD THIS CONCERN. THE FIRST WAS THAT WE HAD PROPOSED THESE DISCUSSIONS SEVERAL MONTHS AGO AND THE FISHING SEASON WAS RAPIDLY APPROACHING. I FELT THAT IT WOULD BE BAD FOR US TO BE PLACED IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO SAY THAT DESPITE OUR EARLY PROPOSALS THE GCOB HAD NOT RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY AND THAT NO EFFORT AT DISCUSSIONS WAS BEING MADE. I THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HARMFUL IN TERMS OF OUR DEALING WITH AMERICAN FISHING INTERESTS WHO, AFTER ALL, HAD A GENUINE INTEREST IN HOW THE GCOB LEGISLATION WAS TO BE IMPLEMENTED. IT WAS ONE THING TO SAY TO THESE INTERESTS THAT WE WERE IN GOOD FAITH PURSUING THE PROBLEM ON A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS AND QUITE ANOTHER TO ASK THEM TO BE PATIENT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FORWARD PROGRESS TO WHICH WE COULD POINT. THE SECOND ISSUE WAS CLOSELY RELATED. WE HAD EMPHASIZED IN EACH OF OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS AND IN OUR WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS OUR CONCERN OVER POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ARISE OUT OF ENFORCEMENT BY THE GCOB OF ITS

LEGISLATION. ONCE AGAIN IT WAS OUR HOPE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD PROCEED RAPIDLY ENOUGH SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE ONSET OF THE NEW FISHING SEASON. I NOTED THAT NEITHER GOVERNMENT ENTIRELY CONTROLLED THE INDIVIDUALS ON EITHER SIDE WHO MIGHT COME INTO CONFLICT IF THE GCOB ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE ITS LEGISLATION PRIOR TO AGREEMENT AS TO THE GUIDELINES WHICH WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY NON-BAHAMIANS FISHING IN GCOB WATERS.

7. ADDERLEY AGREED WITH BOTH THESE POINTS AND ESPECIALLY UNDERLINED HIS OWN CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF COMPLETE CONTROL OVER INDIVIDUALS ON BOTH SIDES. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE IDENTIFIED ANOTHER QUESTION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE EXAMINATION, THAT BEING THAT ANY GCOB PROCEDURE SUCH AS LICENSING COULD ONLY HAVE APPLICABILITY TO US NATIONALS. HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE CUBANS OPERATING OUT OF THE US COULD BE HANDLED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT AGREED THAT WOULD BE AN ISSUE THAT WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 00885 02 OF 03 022100Z

HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT.

8. IN COMPLETING THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION, ADDERLEY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD PUT THE ISSUE TO THE CABINET AND HOPED TO BE BACK TO ME WITH A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OUR SUGGESTION TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS OF THE PROBLEM, HOPEFULLY WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.

9. COMMENT: SEVERAL POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED FROM THIS EXCHANGE. ONE WAS TO CONFIRM THE EARLIER INSIGHT WHICH I DERIVED FROM MY LUNCHEON DISCUSSION WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HANNAH (NASSAU 724), NAMELY, THAT PART OF THE GCOB HANG-UP IS THAT THEY FEEL INADEQUATE IN TERMS OF DEFINING HOW TO GO ABOUT A SENSIBLE EXPLORATION OF THE ISSUE. ANOTHER INTERESTING ASPECT IS THAT ADDERLEY IS APPARENTLY QUITE LIMITED IN WHAT HE MAY DO UNDER HIS OWN INITIATIVE, EVEN INsofar AS ENTERING INTO AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION OF THE SORT CONTEMPLATED WITHOUT GETTING FORMAL CABINET APPROVAL. THIRD, IT SEEMS RATHER LIKELY THAT WE NOW WILL GET AGREEMENT FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS. FOURTH, I WOULD GUESS THAT ONCE WE ENGAGE ON THE ISSUE, WE WILL FIND THAT MANY OF THE APPARENT PROBLEMS ARE BY NO MEANS IRRESOLVABLE. (FOR EXAMPLE, HIS CONCERN ABOUT "NON-US NATIONALS" FISHING IN GCOB WATERS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE COVERED IF THE BOAT IN QUESTION WAS OFFICIALLY LICENSED BY GCOB AS A REGISTERED US FLAG VESSEL.) FIFTH, AND FINALLY, HOWEVER, IT LOOKS TO ME AS IF AT BEST THIS IS GOING TO BE A VERY SLOW PROCESS. I FRANKLY CAN HARDLY IMAGINE IT REACHING A DEFINITIVE CONCLUSION BEFORE THE NEW FISHING SEASON STARTS. THIS MEANS THAT, AS WE GET CLOSER TO THE ONSET OF THE FISHING SEASON, WE WILL HAVE TO REINITIATE A SPECIFIC FOCUS ON THE ISSUES WHICH WOULD BE RAISED BY GCOB ATTEMPT AT ENFORCEMENT

OF THE NEW LAW BEFORE AGREEMENT ON NEW GROUND RULES.
WEISS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 00885 03 OF 03 022112Z

70

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01

CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 OFA-01 COME-00 DLOS-03 DOTE-00

EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 IO-10

JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 NSF-01 OES-03 OMB-01

PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 FEA-01 TRSE-00

/113 W

----- 020891

R 021629Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6779

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

CCGDSEVEN MIAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 NASSAU 885

10. BASE NEGOTIATIONS. ADDERLEY ENTERED INTO THIS DISCUSSION RATHER APOLOGETICALLY, REFERRING TO A DINNER CONVERSATION WHICH WE HAD HAD LAST WEEK. HE SAID THAT, AS HE HAD INDICATED, IT HAD BEEN HIS INTENTION TO RE-ENGAGE SUBSTANTIVELY ON THIS SUBJECT IN MID-MAY. HOWEVER, HE HAD BEEN SO INUNDATED THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PERSONALLY SPEND SUFFICIENT TIME ON THE ISSUE TO PREPARE PROPERLY FOR SUCH A RE-ENGAGEMENT. HE PROMISED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WOULD BE MATTER THAT WE WOULD GET TO SHORTLY AND, IN RESPONSE TO MY SPECIFIC QUESTION, SAID "I AM THINKING MORE IN TERMS OF DAYS THAN OF WEEKS."

11. ADDERLEY WENT ON TO REFER TO THE EARLIER HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED IN RETROSPECT THAT IT HAD PROBABLY BEEN A MISTAKE TO COMMENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1973 SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE GCOB WAS SIMPLY ILL-PREPARED. THAT NOTWITHSTANDING, HOWEVER, HE RECALLED THOSE EARLY NEGO-

TIATIONS, AS WELL AS THE EXCHANGE WITH AMBASSADOR SPIERS WHICH HAD OCCURRED LAST SUMMER. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 00885 03 OF 03 022112Z

THE LATTER EXCHANGE SUGGESTED A BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL DIS-AGREEMENT ON APPROACH. IT WAS THE GCOB POSITION THEN AND REMAINS THERE POSITION NOW THAT THEY HAD ALWAYS SEEN THE QUID PRO QUO TO THE FACILITIES AGREEMENT AS BEING SOME SORT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR THE BAHAMAS, WHEREAS THE US CONTENTED THAT IT HAD CLEARLY REJECTED THAT NOTION, A MATTER WHICH BY IMPLICATION IT WAS ALLEGED THE BAHAMAS UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE RECORD WOULD BEAR OUT HIS CONTENTION THAT THE GCOB INSISTED ON A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BASES AND AN ECONOMIC AID QUID AND HAD NEVER ACCEPTED A DIFFERENT APPROACH. THIS FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT TROUBLED HIM.

12. I SAID THAT HE, OF COURSE, HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE BASIC US POSITION WITH REGARD TO AN ECONOMIC AID QUID PRO QUO REMAINED AS HE TYPIFIED IT, NAMELY, THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE BASES AND ECONOMIC AID WAS APPROPRIATE. I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT I DID NOT AGREE WITH A TYPIFICATION OF THIS DIVERGENCE IN APPROACH AS BEING FUNDAMENTAL OR BY IMPLICATION IRRECONCILABLE. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT MORE IMPORTANT THAN DEBATING WHAT EACH SIDE HAD INTENDED TO CONVEY TO THE OTHER OVER A PERIOD OF THE LAST TWO YEARS, WHAT WE SHOULD START WITH WAS THE BASIC ASSUMPTION THAT THE BAHAMAS AGREED WITH THE DESIRABILITY OF A US BASE PRESENCE MET IN TURN BY THE DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE US TO HAVE SUCH A PRESENCE. CLEARLY, NEITHER DESIRE WAS WITHOUT LIMIT, BUT THIS PROVIDED A FUNDAMENTAL AND IMPORTANT COMMONALITY IN APPROACH. SINCE THE US HAD AGREED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A QUID PRO QUO BY WAY OF A BASE RENTAL, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS TO GET ON WITH THE SPECIFICS OF DEFINING AN ARRANGEMENT. WE HAD MADE A PROPOSAL WHICH WAS APPARENTLY LESS THAN BAHAMIAN EXPECTATIONS. WE WERE NOW AWAITING SPECIFIC COUNTERPROPOSALS. IT WAS, OF COURSE, ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT DESPITE THE COMMONALITY OF DESIRE ON BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE THE US BASE PRESENCE WE COULD NOT AGREE ON THE SPECIFICS OF THE QUID, BUT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WE NEED NOT AT THIS STAGE PREJUDGE THE ISSUE IN THIS FASHION. WHAT WE NEEDED TO DO WAS TO GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS AND THAT WAS WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO AS SOON AS THE GCOB WAS READY TO RE-ENGAGE IN THE NEGOTIATION. ADDERLEY STATED HE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH THAT APPROACH, ALTHOUGH HE FELT IT IMPORTANT TO MENTION THE EARLIER HISTORY BECAUSE HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE RECORD WOULD BEAR OUT THE US

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 00885 03 OF 03 022112Z

CONTENTION. ADDERLEY REPEATED THAT HE WOULD EXPECT THAT WE COULD GET AT THE BASE PROBLEM WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.

13. COMMENT: ADDERLEY GAVE NO INDICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE GCOB POSITION MIGHT BE AS TO REQUIRED MAGNITUDE OF QUID. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE ECONOMIC AID QUID IS NOT YET DEAD. RE-READING ADDERLEY'S COMMENT TO AMBASSADOR SPIERS LAST JULY TO THE EFFECT THAT EVEN IF THE US OFFERED GCOB \$100 MILLION IN CASH IT WOULD NOT KNOW HOW TO HANDLE IT BECAUSE IT HAD NO "PERMANENT ECONOMIC ESTABLISHMENT", SUGGESTS THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AS SEEN BY GCOB. IN SHORT, THE ISSUE MAY NOT BE SOLELY ONE OF MAGNITUDE OF US DOLLARS MADE AVAILABLE BUT THE MANNER IN WHICH THESE RESOURCES CAN BE EFFECTIVELY APPLIED TO GCOB ECONOMIC NEEDS. RECOGNIZING THAT AN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS CLEARLY INFEASIBLE, WE SHALL HAVE TO GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE DILEMMA THUS PRESENTED TO SEE IF THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO SKIN THIS CAT.
WEISS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LAW OF THE SEA, MEETING AGENDA, PRESS COMMENTS, SHELLFISH, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NASSAU00885
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750192-0466
From: NASSAU
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750690/aaaaddzx.tel
Line Count: 404
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23 JUN 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <04 NOV 2003 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MINISTER ADDERLEY ON LOS, LOBSTERS AND US BASES
TAGS: PLOS, EFIS, PFOR, BF, (ADDERLEY)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006